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We measure the response of household spending to the economic stimulus payments (ESPs) disbursed
in mid-2008, using special questions added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey and variation arising
from the randomized timing of when the payments were disbursed. We find that, on average, households
spent about 12-30% (depending on the specification) of their stimulus payments on non-durable expenditures
during the three-month period in which the payments were received. Further, there was also a significant
increase in spending on durable goods, in particular vehicles, bringing the average total spending response
to about 50-90% of the payments. Relative to research on the 2001 tax rebates, these spending responses
are estimated with greater precision using the randomized timing variation. The estimated responses
are substantial and significant for older, lower-income, and home-owning households. We further
extend the literature in two ways. First, we find little evidence that the propensity to spend varies with
the method of disbursement (paper check versus electronic transfer). Second, we evaluate a complementary
methodology for quantifying the impact of tax cuts, which asks consumers to self-report whether they
spent their tax cuts. The response of spending to the ESPs is indeed largest for self-reported spenders.
However, self-reported savers also spent a significant fraction of the payments.
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In the winter of 2007-08, facing the fallout from an increasingly severe financial crisis 
and already contemplating the limitations of traditional monetary policy, Congress and the 
Administration turned to fiscal policy to help stabilize the U.S. economy.  The Economic 
Stimulus Act (ESA) of 2008, enacted in February 2008, consisted primarily of a 100 billion 
dollar program that sent economic stimulus payments (ESPs) to approximately 130 million U.S. 
tax filers.  The desirability of this historically-important use of fiscal policy depends critically on 
the extent to which these tax cuts directly changed household spending, as well as on any 
subsequent multiplier or price effects.  
In this paper, we measure the direct spending effect caused by the receipt of the ESPs, the 
existence of which is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the efficacy of this 
counter-cyclical policy. We begin by measuring the average spending response of households, 
using variation in the randomized timing of when the ESPs were disbursed.  Further, to help 
improve our understanding of consumption in this recession and our models of consumer 
behavior in general, we also analyze the heterogeneity in the spending response across 
households with different characteristics and across different categories of consumption 
expenditures.  Finally, we evaluate whether another well-known and complementary 
methodological approach to identifying the impact of tax cuts -- asking consumers to self-report 
whether they spent (or intend to spend) their tax cuts (e.g., Shapiro and Slemrod, 2009) -- 
accurately identifies households that do and do not actually spend their tax cuts. 
We measure the spending effects of the 2008 ESPs using a natural experiment provided 
by the structure of the payments. The ESPs varied across households in amount, method of 
disbursement, and timing. Typically, single individuals received $300-$600 and couples received 
$600-$1200; in addition, households received $300 per child that qualified for the child tax 
credit. Households received these payments through either paper checks sent by mail or 
electronic funds transfers (EFTs) into their bank accounts. Most importantly, within each 
disbursement method, the timing of receipt was determined by the final two digits of the 
recipient’s Social Security number (SSN), digits that are effectively randomly assigned.
1 We 
exploit this random variation to cleanly estimate the causal effect of the payments on household 
                                                 
1 The last four digits of an SSN are assigned sequentially to applicants within geographic areas (which determine the 
first three digits of the SSN) and a “group” (the middle two digits of the SSN).   2
spending, by comparing the spending of households that received payments in a given period to 
the spending of households that received payments in other periods.   
To conduct our analysis, we worked with the staff at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
to add supplemental questions about the payments to the ongoing Consumer Expenditure (CE) 
Survey, which contains comprehensive measures of household-level expenditures for a stratified 
random sample of U.S. households. These supplemental questions ask CE households to report 
the amount and month of receipt of each stimulus payment they received, as well as the method 
of disbursement of each payment (mailed paper check versus EFT). The responses to these 
questions allow us to measure the impact of the payments on the spending of CE households and 
study the extent to which the method of disbursement influences the propensity to spend. We 
also added a question asking households who previously received stimulus payments to self-
report whether they thought their payments were mostly spent, mostly saved, or mostly used to 
pay down debt. This question mimics the questions in the Michigan Survey of Consumers that 
have been used to study recent changes in tax policy, as in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a).  
Summarizing our main findings, on average households spent about 12-30% of their 
stimulus payments, depending on the specification, on non-durable consumption goods and 
services (as defined in the CE survey) during the three-month period in which the payments were 
received. This response is statistically and economically significant. Although our findings do 
not depend on any particular theoretical model, the response is inconsistent with both Ricardian 
equivalence, which implies no spending response, and with the canonical life-cycle/permanent 
income hypothesis (LCPIH), which implies that households should consume at most the 
annuitized value of a transitory increase in income like that induced by the one-time stimulus 
payments. We also find a significant effect on the purchase of durable goods and related 
services, primarily the purchase of vehicles, bringing the average response of total consumption 
expenditures to about 50-90% of the payments during the three-month period of receipt.  
These results are statistically and economically broadly consistent across specifications 
that use different forms of variation, including specifications that focus on the randomized timing 
variation within each of the two disbursement methods.  The estimated spending responses are 
statistically and economically similar for ESPs received by EFT compared to those received by 
mail, although there is little temporal variation in the former group with which to identify the key 
effect. We also find some evidence of an ongoing though smaller response in the subsequent   3
three-month period following that of ESP receipt, but this response cannot be estimated with 
precision. 
The point estimates of the fraction of the ESPs spent suggest that, relative to the effects 
of the 2001 tax rebates estimated in Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) (JPS), in 2008 the 
spending effect was slightly smaller for nondurable expenditures but more targeted towards 
durables. While this finding may be due to sampling error, it may also reflect some of the 
differences in the details of the tax cut and economic environment in 2008 compared to earlier 
periods. For instance, on average the stimulus payments in 2008 were about twice the size of the 
rebates in 2001, consistent with some prior research that finds that larger payments lead to a 
different composition of spending. While JPS finds no significant response of durable goods in 
2001, Souleles (1999) finds a significant increase in both nondurable and durable goods (in 
particular auto purchases) in response to spring-time Federal income tax refunds, which are 
substantially larger than the 2001 tax rebates.
2 
Our results suggest a significant macroeconomic effect of the 2008 ESPs. The point 
estimates imply that the ESPs directly caused an increase in consumer demand for CE-defined 
nondurable expenditures of $32 to $80 billion (at an annual rate) in the second quarter of 2008 
and $15 to $36 billion (at an annual rate) in the third quarter.  Our estimates for total CE 
spending imply a direct increase of about 1.3 to 2.3 percent of personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE) in the second quarter, and 0.6 to 1.0 percent of PCE in the third quarter 
(again at annual rates).
3 We return to these numbers in the conclusion, but here note again that 
these direct effects on nominal spending demand may have also led to higher prices (not only 
increases in real spending) and/or additional spending through multiplier effects. 
As for results that further inform theories of consumer behavior and credit markets, 
across households, the responses are largest for older and low-income households, groups which 
have substantial and statistically significant spending responses. According to the point 
estimates, the responses are largest for high-asset households, but this result is not statistically 
                                                 
2 See also Barrow and McGranahan (2000) and Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) for related results for the EITC and 
for subprime auto sales.  Federal tax refunds currently average around $2500 per recipient, whereas the average 
rebate in 2001 came to about $480 (JPS). 
3 These figures are based on estimates in Tables 4 and 5 and so omit statistically-insignificant lagged spending. The 
calculations assume that the contemporaneous estimates represent spending done in the month of receipt and the 
month after. Using estimates from Table 7 that include lagged spending effects, the corresponding estimates are, for 
CE-defined nondurable expenditures, $66 billion in the second quarter and $75 billion in the third, and for total 
spending, $198 billion in the second quarter and $227 billion in the third, or 1.9 and 2.2 percent of PCE respectively.   4
significantly different from zero. Further, motivated by the collapse of the housing market in 
2008, we find that homeowners on average spent more of their ESPs than did renters, a 
difference that is statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
Finally, turning to the evaluation of self-reports, we find that households that self-report 
that they mostly spent their ESPs on average did spend more than self-reported savers, yet the 
self-reported savers (including those reporting they reduced debt) also spent a statistically and 
economically significant fraction of their payments. This suggests that relying on self-reports can 
understate the actual causal change in spending in response to changes in income like tax cuts.  
In addition to analyzing the amount of spending directly caused by the 2008 ESPs, our 
paper builds on the related literature in a number of ways. First, relative to JPS, as discussed 
below, we measure with greater precision the response of spending when focusing on random 
variation in the timing of ESP receipt. Second, we consider whether the disbursement method 
(check versus EFT) affects the amount of spending. The 2008 tax cut was the first large tax cut 
to use EFTs, and EFTs seem likely to be used increasingly frequently in the future. Third, we 
evaluate the accuracy of the self-reported responses to the payments, by comparing the self-
reports to our causal estimates using the data on actual spending and ESP receipt. Such an 
evaluation is useful given the potential benefits of surveys that elicit such self-reported data. E.g., 
such surveys can be put into the field and analyzed quickly after policy changes, and they can be 
used to evaluate hypothetical policies and the relevance of different theoretical reasons for 
households’ reported behavior. As a result, the results from such surveys are widely reported.  
This paper is structured as follows. Sections I and II briefly describe the literature and 
relevant aspects of ESA 2008. Section III describes the CE data and Section IV sets forth our 
empirical methodology. Section V presents the main results regarding the short-run response to 
the economic stimulus payments, while Section VI examines the longer-run response. Sections 
VII and VIII examine the differences in response across different households, and across 
different categories of expenditure, respectively. After a concluding section, the Appendices 
contain additional information about ESA 2008 and the data. 
 
I. Related Literature 
Of the many papers that test the consumption-smoothing implications of the rational-
expectations LCPIH, the most closely related to our work is the set of papers that uses   5
household-level data and quasi-experiments to identify the effects on consumption caused by 
predictable changes in income, including in particular income changes induced by tax policy. 
Deaton (1992), Browning and Lusardi (1996), JPS, and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) review 
these literatures well.
4 
Our paper is most closely related to JPS, which uses a similar module of questions 
appended to the CE survey to study the 2001 income tax rebates. JPS finds a relatively large 
response in nondurable expenditure, amounting to about 20-40% of the rebates on average 
during the three-month period in which they were received, but no significant response in 
durable goods. Unlike the current study, however, JPS is unable to identify the response of 
nondurables with precision using only the random variation in timing of rebate receipt. JPS finds 
larger than average responses for households with low liquid wealth or low income, and a 
significant though decaying lagged spending effect, so that on average roughly two-thirds of the 
rebates was spent cumulatively during the quarter of receipt and subsequent three-month period.
5  
Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007) finds consistent results using credit card data and 
direct indicators of being credit constrained; in particular, the spending responses are largest for 
consumers that are constrained by their credit limits. Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a) finds, using 
the Michigan Survey of Consumers, that about 22% of respondents who received (or expected to 
receive) a 2001 rebate report that they will mostly spend their rebate. The authors calculate that, 
under certain assumptions, this result implies an average marginal propensity to consume (MPC) 
of about one third, which is consistent with the short-run response of expenditure in JPS 
estimated from data on actual spending and rebate receipt. 
A few other studies also investigate the 2008 ESPs. First, using scanner data on a subset 
of nondurable retail goods in the first few weeks after the payments started to be disbursed, 
Broda and Parker (2008) finds that spending on such goods increased by a significant amount, 
3.5% in the four weeks after payment receipt. The increase is larger than average for low asset 
and low income households. Second, using data from a payday lender, Bertrand and Morse 
(2009) finds that receipt of an ESP initially reduces the probability of taking out a payday loan. 
The magnitude of the reduction in debt is modest relative to the ESPs, and, after two cycles, 
                                                 
4 For a survey of recent fiscal policy, see e.g., Auerbach and Gale (2009).  
5 Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2009) finds qualitatively similar responses to the 2003 child tax credit payments 
using CE data. Coronado, Lupton, and Sheiner (2006) also study the 2003 child payments, using the Michigan 
Survey.   6
borrowing returns to its pre-ESP level on average. For the most constrained borrowers, by 
contrast, debt does not decline, consistent with the spending dynamics discussed in Agarwal, 
Liu, and Souleles (2007).  
Third, Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) uses the Michigan Survey to analyze the 2008 
stimulus payments, and finds similar results as in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a), with about 20% 
of respondents self-reporting that they will mostly spend their payment. This again corresponds 
to an average MPC of about one third. This response is larger than expected under the LCPIH for 
a transitory tax cut, and it implies a noticeable expansionary effect on aggregate consumption in 
the second and third quarters of 2008. The Michigan survey results provide no clear evidence of 
greater spending by low-income or potentially constrained households.
6   
Finally, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009) reports various summary statistics about the 
CE data on the ESPs and self-reported usage. Nearly half of CE households reported that they 
used their ESP mostly to pay down debt, 18% reported they mostly saved their ESP, and 30% 
reported that they mostly spent it, more than found in Shapiro and Slemrod (2009).  
 
II. The 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments 
 ESA 2008 provided ESPs to the majority of U.S. households (roughly 85% of “tax 
units”). The ESP consisted of a basic payment and -- conditional on eligibility for the basic 
payment -- a supplemental payment of $300 per child that qualified for the child tax credit. To be 
eligible for the basic payment, a household needed to have positive net income tax liability, or at 
least sufficient “qualifying income”.
7 For eligible households, the basic payment was generally 
the maximum of $300 ($600 for couples filing jointly) and their tax liability up to $600 ($1,200 
                                                 
6 In 2008, of the 80 percent of respondents who report they will mostly save their ESP, the majority (about 60 
percent) report that they will mostly pay down debt (as opposed to accumulate assets).  See also Sahm, Shapiro and 
Slemrod (2010). The Michigan Survey includes additional subjective questions about expected future spending. Of 
respondents who said they will initially mostly use the rebate to pay down debt, most report that they will “try to 
keep [down their] lower debt for at least a year.”  (There are analogous results for respondents who said they will 
save by accumulating assets.) The Survey included similar questions in 2001 and yielded similar results (Shapiro 
and Slemrod, 2003b). By contrast, using data on actual spending in 2001, Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007) finds 
that, while on average households initially used some of their rebates to increase credit card payments and thereby 
pay down debt, the resulting liquidity was soon followed by a substantial increase in spending.  
7 While the stimulus payments were commonly referred to as “tax rebates,” strictly speaking they were advance 
payments for credit against tax year 2008 taxes. To expedite the disbursement of the payments, they were calculated 
using data from the tax year 2007 returns (and so only those filing 2007 returns received the payments). If 
subsequently a household’s tax year 2008 data implied a larger payment, the household could claim the difference 
on its 2008 return filed in 2009. However, if the 2008 data implied a smaller payment, the household did not have to 
return the difference.    7
for couples). Households without tax liability received basic payments of $300 ($600 for 
couples), so long as they had at least $3,000 of qualifying income (which includes earned income 
and Social Security benefits, as well as certain Railroad Retirement and veterans’ benefits). 
Moreover, the total stimulus payment phased out with income, being reduced by five percent of 
the amount by which adjusted gross income exceeded $75,000 ($150,000 for couples). As a 
result, the stimulus payments were more targeted to lower-income households than were the 
2001 income tax rebates. 
The key to our measurement strategy is that the timing of ESP disbursement was 
effectively randomized across households. Table 1 shows the schedule of ESP disbursement.
8 
For recipients who had provided the IRS with their personal bank routing number (i.e., for direct 
deposit of a tax refund), the stimulus payments were disbursed electronically over a three-week 
period ranging from late April to mid May.
9 The IRS mailed a notice to the recipients in advance 
of the EFTs. Appendix A provides an example of this notice. For households that did not provide 
a personal bank routing number, the payments were mailed using paper checks over a nine-week 
period ranging from early May through early July.
10 The recipients of these checks received a 
similar notice in advance of the checks.
11 Importantly, within each disbursement method, the 
particular timing of the payment was determined by the last two digits of the recipients’ Social 
Security numbers, which are effectively randomly assigned. 
                                                 
8 The IRS schedule reports the latest date by which the ESPs are supposed to have been received by households. 
Accordingly, as also discussed below, the payments were disbursed (ie, put in the mail or electronically transferred 
to banks) slightly earlier. 
9 Payments were directly deposited only to personal bank accounts. Payments were mailed to tax filers who had 
provided the IRS with their tax preparer’s routing number, eg as part of taking out a “refund anticipation loan”. Such 
situations are common, representing about a third of the tax refunds delivered via direct deposit in 2007.  
10 Due to the electronic deposits, about half of the aggregate stimulus payments were disbursed by the end of May. 
While most of the rest of the payments came in June and July, taxpayers that filed their 2007 return late could 
receive their payment later than the above schedule.
 Since about 92 percent of taxpayers typically file at or before 
the normal April 15
th deadline (Slemrod et al., 1997),
 this source of variation is small. Nonetheless, we present 
results below that exclude such late payments. Finally, due to human and computer error, about 350,000 households 
(less than 1 percent) did not receive the child tax credit component of their ESP with their basic ESP. The IRS took 
steps to identify these households and sent all affected households paper checks for the amount due for just the child 
credit, starting in early July. 
11 For paper checks, the notices were mailed about a week before the checks were mailed. For EFTs, the notices 
were sent a couple of business days before the direct deposits were supposed to be credited. The recipients’ banks 
were also notified a couple of days before the date of the electronic transfers, and some banks might have credited 
some of the electronic payments to the recipients’ accounts a day or more before the official payment date.  For 
example, some EFTs deposited on Monday April 28 were reported to the banks on Thursday April 24, and some 
banks appear to have credited accounts on Friday April 25.   8
In aggregate the stimulus payments in 2008 were historically large, amounting to about 
$100 billion, which in real terms is about double the size of the 2001 rebate program. According 
to the Department of the Treasury (2008), $78.8 billion in ESPs was disbursed in the second 
quarter of 2008, which corresponds to about 2.2% of GDP or 3.1% of PCE in that quarter. 
During the third quarter, $15 billion in ESPs was disbursed, corresponding to about 0.4% of 
GDP or 0.6% of PCE. The stimulus payments constituted about two-thirds of the total ESA 
package, which also included various business incentives and foreclosure relief.
12 This paper 
focuses on the stimulus payments, as recorded in our CE dataset. 
 
III. The Consumer Expenditure Survey 
The CE interview survey contains detailed measures of the expenditures of a stratified 
random sample of U.S. households. CE households are interviewed five times. After an 
introductory interview that collects demographic and income information, households are 
interviewed up to four more times, at three month intervals. In these second to fifth interviews, 
households report their expenditures during the preceding three months (the “reference period”). 
The CE survey also gathers some limited information about wealth. New households are added 
to the survey every month, so the data can be used to identify spending effects from ESPs 
disbursed in different months. We use the 2007 and 2008 waves of the CE data (which include 
interviews in the first quarter of 2009). 
Two special modules of questions about the 2008 ESPs were added to the CE survey in 
interviews conducted between June 2008 and March 2009, which covers the crucial time during 
which the payments were disbursed.
13 The first module of questions was phrased to be consistent 
with the style of other CE questions and the 2001 tax rebate questions. The new questions asked 
households whether they received any “economic stimulus payments… also called a tax rebate” 
since the beginning of the reference period for the interview and, if so, the amount of each 
payment and the date it was received. Going beyond the 2001 questions, this first module also 
asked, for each payment, whether it was received by check or direct deposit. These questions 
were asked in all five CE interviews.
14  
                                                 
12 For more details on ESA, see e.g., CCH (2008) and Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod (2010).  
13 Ideally, since some ESPs arrived in April, the survey would have been in the field in May, e.g. for respondents 
whose last interview was in May. 
14 In the introductory interview, the ESP reference period is the preceding one month.   9
The second module, also new in 2008, was asked at most once, and only of households 
that had previously reported a payment. These households were asked whether the payment led 
them “mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase savings, or mostly to pay off debt.”  The 
wording of this question closely follows the main question in the Michigan Survey of Consumers 
analyzed by Shapiro and Slemrod (2009). Appendix B contains the language of the CE survey 
instruments. 
Turning to our use of the CE data, for each household-reference period, we follow JPS 
and sum all stimulus payments received by the household in that three-month period to create 
our main economic stimulus payment variable, ESP. We also follow JPS in our definition of 
expenditures. Specifically, we focus on a series of increasingly aggregated measures of 
consumption expenditures. First, we study expenditures on food, which include food consumed 
away from home, food consumed at home, and purchases of alcoholic beverages. Much previous 
research has studied such expenditure on food, largely because of its availability in most years of 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, but it is a narrow measure of expenditure. Our second 
measure of consumption expenditures is a subset of nondurable expenditures, denoted “strictly 
nondurable” expenditures, which follows Lusardi (1996) and includes CE categories like 
utilities, household operations, gas, personal care, and tobacco. Third, our broadest and main 
measure of spending on nondurable goods and services, denoted nondurable expenditures, 
follows previous research using the CE survey and includes semi-durable categories like apparel, 
health and reading materials. Finally, total expenditures also includes durable expenditures such 
as home furnishings, entertainment equipment, and auto purchases.
15 Appendix C provides 
further details about the data.  
For our analysis, we use only data on households that have at least one expenditure 
interview during the period in which the ESP questions were in the field. The resulting sample 
period starts with interviews in September 2007 (when period t in equation (1) below covers 
expenditures in June to August 2007) and runs through interviews in March 2009 (when period 
t+1 covers December 2008 to February 2009). Also, we drop from the sample any household 
                                                 
15 Unlike in JPS, we find that the spending effect on total expenditures in 2008 is estimated with relative statistical 
precision. This could in part reflect the larger number of payments (about 30 percent more) in the sample in 2008, 
and the larger size (over double) of these payments. Suggestive of an improvement in data quality, there is also a 
decline in the ratio of the standard deviation of the change in household-level expenditures to the average level of 
expenditures between 2001 and 2008 for all our major categories. This may be due to the CE survey’s transition in 
2003 from using survey booklets to using computer-assisted personal-interview (CAPI) software.     10
observation (t or t+1) with implausibly low expenditures (the bottom 1% of nondurable 
expenditures in levels), unusually large changes in age or family size, and uncertain stimulus 
payment status.
16  
Figure 1 shows our calculations of the aggregate amount of ESPs reported in the raw CE 
data by month, and the corresponding amount of ESP disbursement reported in the Daily 
Treasury Statements (DTS) (Department of the Treasury (2008)). During 2008, the ESPs 
reported in the CE survey aggregate to $94.6 billion, which is quite close to the $96.2 billion in 
ESPs in the DTS data. The temporal pattern of ESP receipt is also broadly similar across the two 
sources, though the CE data has fewer ESPs reported during the peak month of May and more in 
the following months. This suggests the possibility that some households took time to notice 
their ESP receipt, or that there is some other tendency to report a somewhat later date of receipt 
than actually occurred. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for our final full sample and subsamples that we 
further analyze. The average value of ESP, conditional on a positive value, is about $1000. 
Households that receive ESPs by EFT have slightly higher expenditures, are slightly younger, 
have higher incomes and liquid assets, and have larger ESPs, than households that receive the 
payments by mail.  
Table 3 shows more information about the distribution of ESPs in our dataset. Panel A 
shows that, consistent with the payments specified by ESA, most reported ESPs are in multiples 
of $300, with about 55% of reports reflecting the (maximum) basic payments of $600 or $1,200. 
Panel B shows the pattern of ESPs by interview reference period. During the expenditure 
reference period that covers the main time of disbursement of the payments (May - July), about 
two-thirds of households report receiving a payment.  
 
IV. Empirical Methodology  
Consistent with specifications in the previous literature (e.g., Zeldes (1989), Lusardi 
(1996), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), and JPS), our main estimating equation is: 
  C i,t+1 - Ci,t  =   Σs β0s*months,i  +  β1'Xi,t   +  β2 ESPi,t+1  +  ui,t+1 ,    (1) 
                                                 
16 Our initial analysis of the ESP data uncovered a peculiar pattern in the raw data. When we notified the BLS, they 
determined that there had been an internal processing error, and worked rapidly to release a corrected version of the 
ESP data. We use this corrected version.   11
where i indexes households and t indexes time, C  is either household consumption expenditures 
or their log; month represents a complete set of indicator variables for every period in the 
sample, used to absorb the seasonal variation in consumption expenditures as well as the average 
of all other concurrent aggregate factors; and X represents control variables (here age and 
changes in family size) included to absorb some of the preference-driven differences in the 
growth rate of consumption expenditures across households. ESPi,t+1 represents our key stimulus 
payment variable, which takes one of three forms: i) the total dollar amount of payments 
received by household i in period t+1 (ESPi,t+1); ii) a dummy variable indicating whether any 
payment was received in t+1 (I(ESPi,t+1>0)); and iii) a distributed lag of ESP or I(ESP >0), used 
to measure the longer-run effects of the payments. We correct the standard errors to allow for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-household serial correlation. As an extension, to analyze 
heterogeneity in the response to the payments, we interact ESPi,t+1 with indicators for different 
types of households. The key coefficient β2 measures the average response of household 
expenditure to the arrival of a stimulus payment.
17  
Most of the recent literature on the LCPIH focuses on testing the null hypothesis that β2  
is zero using variation in predictable changes in income and the assumption that the residual 
(ui,t+1) is orthogonal to all information potentially known to a household at the start of period t, 
including the change in income (Chamberlain, 1984; Souleles, 2004).  By contrast, we can use 
the randomized timing of ESP receipt to ensure orthogonality between the residual and the 
predictable change in income that comes with the arrival of an ESP. This allows us to estimate β2 
and thus measure the causal effect of the payments on expenditure, regardless of whether the 
LCPIH is true or not.
  That said, our estimate still provides a direct test of the LCPIH.
18 The 
rational-expectations LCPIH (or Ricardian equivalence) implies that β2=0. Even if instead 
                                                 
17 Our empirical approach focuses on consumers’ response to the receipt of their stimulus payments, a point in time 
that our data identifies.  Our methodology cannot estimate the magnitude of any earlier response that may have 
occurred in anticipation of the payments, both because the passage of ESA cannot be separated from other aggregate 
effects captured by our time dummies, such as seasonality, and because there is no single point in time at which a 
tax cut went from being entirely unexpected to being entirely expected. 
18 Even though February 2008 can fall in period t for some sample households receiving a payment, under our 
maintained assumptions, any effect of the announcement on spending due to the passage of ESA does not bias our 
estimate of β2. Whenever information about the tax cuts underlying the ESPs became publicly available, whether 
preceding the actual passage of ESA or not, any resulting wealth effects should be small, and should have arisen at 
the same time(s) for all consumers, so their average effects on expenditure would be picked up by the corresponding 
time dummies in equation (1). More importantly, heterogeneity in such wealth effects (or in b2) should not be 
correlated with the timing of ESP receipt, so (the average) β2  should still be estimated consistently.   12
households were actually surprised by the payment, β2 should still be small under the LCPIH, 
because the one-time payment represents a transitory increase in income.  
   
V. The Short-Run Response of Expenditure 
This section estimates the short-run change in consumption expenditures caused by 
receipt of the stimulus payments, using the contemporaneous payment variables ESPt+1 and 
I(ESPt+1>0) in equation (1). We begin by estimating (the average) β2 in the full sample using all 
available variation. While this variation is analogous to that used in most of the previous LCPIH 
literature, we can go further and assess the validity of this variation. We refine our identification 
strategy by dropping non-recipients and late recipients from our sample and by using only the 
variation in the timing of ESP receipt within each method of disbursement (check versus EFT). 
The following section estimates the lagged response to the payments.  
A.  Variation across all households 
We begin by estimating equation (1) using all available households and using ESP as the 
key regressor, which utilizes all of the available information about the payments received by 
each household, including the dollar amount of the ESP. In Table 4, the first set of four columns 
displays the results of estimating equation (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS), with the dollar 
change in consumption expenditures as the dependent variable and the contemporaneous amount 
of the payment (ESPt+1) as the key independent variable. The resulting estimates of β2 measure 
the average fraction of the payment spent on the different expenditure aggregates in each 
column, within the three-month reference-period in which the payment was received.  
We find that, during the three-month period in which a payment was received, relative to 
the previous three-month period, a household on average increased its expenditures on food by 
about 2% of the payment, its strictly nondurable expenditures by 8% of the payment, and its 
nondurable expenditures by 12% of the payment. The third result is statistically significant. In 
the fourth column, total consumption expenditures increased on average by 52% of the payment, 
a substantial and statistically significant amount. This result is relatively precisely estimated, 
especially considering that the difference with the preceding results largely reflects durable 
expenditures, which are much more volatile than nondurable expenditures.  
These results identify the effect of a payment from variation in both the timing of 
payment receipt and the dollar amount of the payment. While the variation in the payment   13
amount is possibly uncorrelated with the residual in equation (1), it is not purely random since 
the amount depends upon household characteristics such as tax status, income, and number of 
dependents. Unlike most previous research, we can refine the variation that we use.  
The remaining columns of Table 4 use only variation in whether a payment was received 
at all in a given period, not the dollar amount of payments received. The second set of columns 
in the table uses the indicator variable I(ESPt+1>0) in equation (1). In this case β2 measures the 
average dollar increase in expenditures caused by receipt of a payment. The estimated responses 
again increase in magnitude across the successive expenditure aggregates. During the three-
month period in which a payment was received, relative to the previous three-month period, 
households on average increased their nondurable expenditures by about $120, which is 
statistically significant at the 7% level. Total expenditures increased by a significant $495. 
Compared to an average payment of just under $1,000, these results are consistent with the 
previous estimates in the first set of columns, which also used variation in the magnitude of the 
payments received. 
As a robustness check, the third set of columns in Table 4 uses the change in log 
expenditures as the dependent variable. On average in the three-month period in which a 
payment was received, relative to the previous three-month period, nondurable expenditures 
increased by 2.1%, and total expenditures increased by 3.2%. These are again statistically and 
economically significant effects. At the average ESP and level of nondurable and total 
expenditures (Table 2), these results imply propensities to spend of 0.116 and 0.354 respectively, 
which are consistent with, though slightly smaller than, the previous results in the table. 
Finally, to estimate a value interpretable as a marginal propensity to spend upon the 
payment’s arrival without using variation in ESP amount, we estimate equation (1) by two-stage 
least squares (2SLS). We instrument for the payment amount, ESP, using the indicator variable, 
I(ESP >0), along with the other independent variables. As in the first four columns, β2 then 
measures the fraction of the payment that is spent within the three-month period of receipt. As 
shown in the last set of columns in Table 4, the estimated marginal propensities to spend remain 
close in magnitude to those estimated in the first four columns, which did not treat ESP as   14
potentially non-exogenous. The findings in Table 4 are generally robust across a number of 
additional sensitivity checks.
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B.  Variation among households that receive ESPs at some time 
The results in Table 4 identify the effect on spending by comparing the behavior of 
households that received payments at different times to the behavior of households that did not 
receive payments at those times. Since some households did not receive any payment, in any 
period, the results still use some information that comes from comparing households that 
received payments to households that never received payments. We now investigate the role of 
this variation using a number of different approaches, for brevity focusing on strictly nondurable 
expenditures, nondurable expenditures, and total expenditures.  
First, in Table 5, Panel A adds to equation (1) an indicator for households that received a 
payment in any reference quarter, I(Σhousehold  ESP >0), which allows the expenditure growth of 
payment recipients to differ on average from that of non-recipients. In this case, the main 
regressor I(ESPt+1>0) captures only higher-frequency variation in the timing of payment receipt 
-- receipt in quarter t+1 in particular -- conditional on receipt in some quarter. As reported in 
Table 5, the estimated coefficients on I(Σhousehold ESP >0) are always small and statistically 
insignificant. Hence, apart from the effect of the payment, the expenditure growth of payment 
recipients is on average similar to that of non-recipients over the quarters in the sample period 
around the payments. Moreover, the estimated coefficients for the effect of the payment (ESPt +1 
and I(ESPt +1>0)) are rather similar to those in Table 4. Hence the results in Table 4 are not 
driven by differences in expenditure growth between payment recipients and non-recipients over 
the sample period. That is, controlling for whether a household ever received a payment, 
spending significantly increases in the particular quarter of payment receipt. 
Our second approach is more stringent. Panel B of Table 5 excludes from the sample all 
households that did not report a payment in any of their reference quarters. The advantage of this 
                                                 
19 For example, using median regressions or winsorizing the dependent variable leads to very similar results for 
food, strictly nondurables, and nondurables. For total expenditures, the resulting coefficients are generally smaller 
than in Table 4, though still statistically and economically significant (substantially larger than those for nondurable 
expenditures). This reduction in point estimates for total expenditures is consistent with iatrogenic bias in these 
alternative specifications, since the distribution of expenditure changes (dC) has much more of its mass in the tails 
for total expenditures than for nondurable expenditures. In particular, below we find that much of durable spending 
is the purchase of cars. If the ESPs cause car purchases, then by dropping these “outliers,” one obviously biases 
down the estimates of the average spending caused by the ESP. Weighting the sample leads to very similar results as 
in Table 4, for all four expenditure aggregates.      15
approach is that, when we do not use variation in ESP amount, the response of spending is 
identified using only the variation in the timing of payment receipt conditional on receipt. That 
is, identification comes from comparing the spending of households that received payments in a 
given period to the spending of households that also received payments but in other periods. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it leads to a reduction in power due to the resulting decline 
in sample size and effective variation. Nonetheless, the results are broadly consistent with the 
previous results (especially when considering the confidence intervals). While as expected the 
standard errors increase, the point estimates are also somewhat larger than before, and so the 
results are all statistically significant.   
Finally, we focus on the randomized variation in the timing of ESP receipt by dropping 
all households that received late stimulus payments, after the main period of their (randomized) 
disbursement.  Although the timing of late payments is not necessarily endogenous, it is not 
randomized. The vast majority of households that received late ESPs did so due to filing late tax 
returns for tax-year 2007, although as seen in Figure 2, there also seem to be some lags in 
reporting (or in noticing) the payments in the CE survey. We follow JPS and allow one month’s 
“grace period” in excluding late ESPs, so that we consider a mailed payment late if it is reported 
received after August, and an electronic payment (or one with missing data on the method of 
disbursement) late if it is reported received after June.  
Table 5 Panel C shows that the results remain statistically and economically significant. 
In the final set of columns using 2SLS, on average nondurable expenditures increased by 31% of 
the payment in the quarter of receipt, relative to the previous quarter, and total expenditures 
increased by 91% of the payment. Given that this approach has sufficient power to identify the 
key parameter of interest, we focus on this sample as our main sample for the balance of the 
paper.  
As another robustness check, Figure 2 compares histograms of the distribution of changes 
in expenditure for observations during which an ESP is received versus observations during 
which an ESP is not received. The figure focuses on the sample of on-time recipients and the 
time period during which the ESPs were being distributed (i.e., when the t+1 interview occurs 
between June 2008 and October 2008, with the corresponding expenditure reference periods 
covering the preceding three months). As shown, there is a larger share of recipients than non-
recipients in most ranges of increases in spending, and a larger share of non-recipients than   16
recipients in most ranges of decreases in spending. (Each cell represents a $300 range in Panel A, 
and a $600 range in Panel B, so these differences are economically significant). While these 
histograms do not control for any covariates, they support our main findings non-parametrically 
in the raw data and show that outliers are not driving the main findings.
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In sum, even when limiting the variation to the timing of ESP receipt conditional on 
(non-late) receipt, the results imply that the ESPs had a significant effect on household spending. 
By contrast, in JPS, analogously limiting the sample to non-late rebate recipients leads to a larger 
reduction in precision and a loss of statistical significance. 
C.  Method of disbursement 
One novel feature of the 2008 ESP program was the use of electronic funds transfers in 
addition to mailed checks. About 40% of the CE households received their payments via EFTs, 
and the use of EFTs is likely to increase in the future. This subsection first asks whether the 
method of disbursement affects the estimated spending impact of the ESPs. Second, since the 
method of disbursement is not randomly assigned and affects the time of receipt, one can think 
of the ESP program as providing two natural experiments within distinct samples. Accordingly, 
we proceed to investigate whether the spending response differs across the two methods of 
disbursement, and whether we can identify the causal effect of a payment from only the 
difference in arrival times within each method of disbursement. 
We begin by estimating the separate response of spending to EFTs and to paper checks, 
using the analogues of ESP and I(ESP>0) for payments received by check and by EFT. We start 
with the entire sample of households, including non-recipients, because there is limited temporal 
variation within ESPs received by EFT.
21 As shown in Panel A of Table 6, the estimated 
coefficients are generally similar (and not statistically significantly different) across the two 
disbursement methods, across all the columns. If anything, the point estimates are somewhat 
larger for the EFTs.  Next, Panel B uses only the variation within the households that receive 
only on-time ESPs. The results are similar to those in Panel A in that the estimated coefficients 
are generally similar (and not statistically significantly different) across the two disbursement 
methods, though now the point estimates are somewhat larger for the mailed checks. Not 
surprisingly, since the EFTs were disbursed over just a few weeks, using just timing variation 
                                                 
20 The analogous histograms are very similar for the sample in Table 4. 
21 A few observations have missing values for the method-of-disbursement question, and so are dropped from the 
sample.    17
leads to relatively less power for estimating the effect of EFT receipt, especially for the noisier 
total expenditure category. And the smaller number of ESPs used to identify the effects of a 
mailed ESP also raise its standard errors. In sum, these results provide little evidence that the 
method of disbursement significantly affected the average response of spending. 
We now turn to the question of whether we can identify the spending effect using only 
the randomized variation in spending within households that receive only on-time ESPs by check 
and within households that receive only on-time ESPs by EFT. This approach allows for the 
selection into each group to be non-random. For example, households receiving EFTs have 
somewhat higher income on average than households receiving paper checks, and might also be 
different in other, hard to observe ways (e.g., perhaps they are more technologically savvy).  
Panels A and B, already discussed, provide some evidence that the spending effect does 
not differ by method of disbursement. The coefficients in panel B in particular are identified 
from variation within each group. Importantly, for ESPs received by mail, which provide more 
temporal variation, the results are statistically significant and broadly similar to the average 
response in the final panel of Table 5. That is, even separately controlling for receipt of EFTs, 
using the random variation in the timing of the mailed checks still yields a significant response of 
spending to the mailed checks.   
These results still impose common month dummies and common demographic effects 
(age and changes in family size) across EFT and mailed-check recipients. Also, to gauge the 
impact of the stimulus program, we want to estimate the average response to the stimulus 
payments. Accordingly, as an extension, Panel C of Table 6 presents estimates from a pooled 
regression that allows for separate time dummies and demographic effects across three groups of 
households: a) households who received only paper checks; b) households who received only 
EFTs; c) households who received both paper checks and EFTs.
22 The resulting coefficient 
measures the average spending effect of the receipt of an ESP independent of its method of 
disbursement, but allowing for households to be distributed across the different possible 
disbursement methods in a way that is potentially correlated with their spending dynamics due to 
other factors. While slightly smaller and less statistically significant, the estimates in Panel C 
                                                 
22 About 2 percent of households received both EFTs and paper checks. Across all the columns in Panel C, the 
coefficients on the time dummies (jointly) and the demographic variables (jointly) never significantly vary across 
the two main groups of households, those who received only EFTs and those who received only mailed checks. 
These coefficients are sometimes significantly different only for the few households who received both EFTs and 
paper checks, relative to the two main groups.   18
remain broadly similar to the previous estimates, even though they are driven only by the 
randomized variation in timing within each group (primarily paper checks, since the EFTs have 
limited timing variation).  
In sum, our findings remain broadly consistent across specifications that use different 
forms of variation. Of course, using different variation sometimes induces changes in the point 
estimates across specifications, especially for total expenditures, but not significantly so relative 
to the corresponding confidence intervals.  
 
VI. The Longer-Run Response of Expenditure 
To investigate the longer-run effect of the stimulus payments, we add the first lag of the 
payment variable, ESPt, as an additional regressor in equation (1). We continue to focus on the 
sample of households that only receive ESPs on time (as in Panel C of Table 5).   
As shown in Table 7, the presence of the lagged variable does not much alter our 
previous conclusions about the short-run impact of the payment, although the coefficients on 
ESPt+1 are slightly smaller than the corresponding results in Panel C of Table 5. Moreover, the 
receipt of a payment causes a change in spending one quarter later (i.e., from the three-month 
period of receipt to the next three-month period) that uniformly is negative but smaller in 
absolute magnitude than the contemporaneous change. Since the net effect of the payment on the 
level of spending in the later quarter (relative to the level in the quarter before receipt) is given 
by the sum of the coefficients on ESPt and ESPt+1, this implies that, after increasing in the three-
month period of payment receipt, spending remains high, though less high, in the subsequent 
three-month period.  
These lagged spending effects are, however, estimated with less precision than the 
contemporaneous effects. For example, in the second-to-last column, for nondurable 
expenditures using 2SLS, nondurable expenditures rise by 25.4% of the payment in the quarter 
of receipt. The expenditure change in the next quarter is -9.7%, so that nondurable expenditures 
in the second three-month period are still higher on net than before payment receipt by 25.4%-
9.7% ≈ 15.7% of the payment (penultimate row of results). The cumulative change in nondurable 
expenditures over both three-month periods is then estimated to be 25.4% + 15.7% = 41.1% of 
the payment (bottom row). However, neither the 15% change in the second period nor the 41% 
cumulative change is statistically significant. The second-period and cumulative changes are also   19
insignificant in the other columns that use 2SLS.  However, in the first triplet of columns, using 
variation in the amount of the ESP increases statistical power, so that we find statistically 
significant effects on spending in the second period for strictly nondurable goods, and on 
cumulative spending for both strictly nondurable and nondurable expenditure.
23  
 In sum, while the point estimates suggest some ongoing though decaying spending 
response to the ESPs in the subsequent quarter after receipt, this lagged response cannot be 
estimated with precision, even on average over the sample period. Hence, in the subsequent 
extensions in which we estimate spending effects on subsamples of households and goods, which 
reduces statistical power, we focus on the more precisely estimated short-run response.  
    
VII. Differences in Responses across Households  
This section and the next section analyze heterogeneity in the response to the stimulus 
payment, across different types of households and different subcategories of consumption 
expenditures, respectively. This analysis provides some evidence about why households’ 
expenditures respond to the payments. For brevity, we report results from the 2SLS specification, 
instrumenting the payment ESP (and any interaction terms) with the corresponding indicator 
variables for payment receipt I(ESP>0) (and their interactions, along with the other independent 
variables), for the sample of households receiving only non-late payments.  
A.  Spending propensities by age, income and liquid wealth 
The presence of liquidity constraints is a leading explanation for why household spending 
might increase in response to a previously announced increase in income. To investigate this 
explanation, we test whether households that were relatively likely to be constrained were more 
likely to increase their spending upon the arrival of a payment. Constrained households may be 
unable or unwilling to increase their spending prior to the payment arrival. On the other hand, 
unconstrained households (e.g., high wealth or high income households) may find the costs of 
not smoothing consumption across the arrival of the payment to be small (Caballero, 1995; 
Parker, 1999; Sims, 2003; and Reis, 2006).  
Expanding equation (1), we interact the intercept and ESPt+1 variable with indicator 
variables (Low and High) based on various household characteristics (all from households’ first 
                                                 
23 The coefficients are generally slightly smaller and the statistical significance slightly lower in the sample 
comprised of all households.    20
CE expenditure interview to minimize any endogeneity). We use three different proxy variables 
to identify households that may be disproportionately likely to be liquidity constrained: age, 
income (family income before taxes), and liquid assets (the sum of balances in checking and 
saving accounts). While liquid assets is arguably the most directly relevant of these variables for 
identifying liquidity constraints, it is the least well measured and the most often missing in the 
CE data, so we start with the other two variables.
24 For each variable, we split households into 
three groups (Low, High, and the intermediate baseline group), with the cutoffs between groups 
chosen to include about a third of the payment recipients in each group.  
Table 8 begins by testing whether the propensity to spend the stimulus payments differs 
by age. Because young households typically have low liquid wealth and high income growth, 
they are disproportionately likely to be liquidity constrained (e.g., Jappelli, 1990; Jappelli et. al., 
1998).
25 In the first set of columns in the table, Low refers to young households (40 years old or 
younger) and High refers to older households (older than 58), and the coefficients on the 
interaction terms with these variables represent differences relative to the households in the 
baseline, middle-age group. As reported, the point estimates for the interaction terms suggest that 
young households spent relatively less of the payment and old households spent relatively more. 
However these differences, while economically large, are not statistically significant. 
Nonetheless, in absolute terms the spending by old households (see bottom panel for the 
interacted groups) and by the middle-age households (main panel for the baseline group) are both 
statistically and economically significant.  
The second set of columns in Table 8 tests for differences in spending across income 
groups. The point estimates suggest that low-income households spent a much larger fraction of 
their payment on total expenditures relative to the typical (baseline middle-income) household. 
In absolute terms for total expenditures, of the three groups, only the response for the low-
income households is statistically significant. The response is also economically significant, 
averaging about 125% of the payment.
26 However, while suggestive of possible role for liquidity 
                                                 
24 The CE survey does not include the direct measures of borrowing and credit constraints used by Jappelli (1990) 
and Jappelli et. al. (1998), or Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles (2007). 
25 There is also evidence that some older households increase their spending on receiving their (predictable) pension 
checks (Wilcox, 1989; and Stephens, 2003). Outside the null LCPIH hypothesis of β2=0, older households might 
also spend relatively more because they have shorter time horizons on average. 
26 It is not inconsistent for the average spending response to be larger in magnitude than the average payment, even 
putting aside the confidence intervals for the former, if enough households buy large durables like autos in response 
to receiving a payment, as found below.   21
constraints, the difference between this result and that for the baseline group, although 
economically large at about 70% of the ESP, is not statistically significant.   
   The last set of columns in Table 8 tests for differences by liquid asset holdings. While the 
point estimates suggest little spending by low-asset households, the associated confidence 
interval is quite large, and none of the differences (although large in point estimate) are 
statistically significant. Indeed, even the total amounts of spending in absolute terms are 
insignificant for all three groups, for both nondurable expenditures and total expenditures. The 
loss of precision when using the asset variable might reflect the smaller sample sizes due to 
missing asset values and measurement error in the available asset values.   
One possible complication in assessing liquidity constraints during the sample period is 
that households might have expected the recent recession to last longer than usual. For instance, 
if constrained households expect their constraints to bind for a year or two after receiving a 
payment, rather than for just a few months, this would reduce the magnitude of their current 
response to the payment. 
B.  Spending propensities by homeownership status  
Another key characteristic of the recent recession was the large decline in housing wealth 
and the reduced ability to borrow against home equity. To examine the potential implications for 
the response to the ESPs, Table 9 presents estimates of the spending responses according to 
housing status. The baseline group is renters (23% of the sample), and the two interacted groups 
are homeowners with a mortgage (50%) and homeowners without a mortgage (27%). The point 
estimates suggest much larger spending responses by both groups of homeowners relative to 
renters, though the differences are not statistically significant. In absolute terms, homeowners 
have large and significant responses for all three expenditure categories, whereas the response of 
renters is smaller and insignificant. As an extension, combining homeowners into one group, the 
estimated spending responses for total expenditures are 1.051 (0.351) for homeowners and 0.434 
(0.454) for renters, and these estimates are statistically significantly different at the 10 percent 
level.
27   
                                                 
27 The results for homeowners do not simply reflect the preceding results for older households. E.g., if one drops 
from the sample the households older than 65, the coefficients for nondurable expenditure remain very similar to 
those reported in Table 9, for all three groups of homeowner status. The coefficients for total expenditure remain 
very similar for renters and homeowners with mortgages. While the coefficient for total expenditure loses 
significance for homeowners without mortgages, presumably in part due to the reduced sample of such homeowners,   22
C.  Spending propensities by self-reported spending propensities  
Finally, we evaluate the alternative methodological approach that identifies the impact of 
tax cuts by asking consumers to self-report whether they spent their tax cut. In our sample of on-
time ESP recipients, 32% reported that they mostly spent their payment, 18% reported they 
mostly saved it, and 50% reported they mostly used it to pay down debt.
28  We interact ESP with 
indicator variables for self-reports of mostly spend and of mostly pay down debt, with mostly 
save being the baseline category.   
Supporting the use of self-reports, Table 10 shows that households reporting that they 
mostly spent their ESPs did in fact spend more of the payment than the other groups, according 
to the point estimates. In absolute terms their spending is statistically and economically 
significant, across all the expenditure categories. In relative terms, they spent about 35% more of 
the payment on nondurable expenditures than the baseline group, the self-reported savers, and 
this difference is statistically significant. The corresponding difference for total expenditures is 
even larger in magnitude, at 75% of the ESP on average, but is not statistically significant.    
On the other hand, even for the self-reported “non-spenders,” the receipt of an ESP 
caused significant spending. For self-reported savers, the response of total expenditures is 
statistically significant and large at 95% of the payment on average. For households who 
reported they paid down debt, the response of total expenditures is still large at about 63%, albeit 
statistically insignificant, and the response of nondurable expenditures is statistically significant 
and still rather large at 27% of the payment. In this sense self-reported spending may understate 
the actual amount of spending (see also Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles, 2007). 
 
VIII. Differences in Responses across Types of Expenditure 
Turning to differences across types of expenditures, each column in Table 11 reports the 
estimated change in spending for each subcategory of expenditures within the broad measure of 
nondurable expenditures (a complete decomposition). The columns also report, in the bottom 
panel, the share of the estimated overall increase in nondurable expenditures due to the ESPs that 
is accounted for by each of the subcategories, and for benchmarking, the average share of each 
                                                                                                                                                             
it remains large in magnitude; and as in the table, the coefficient for nondurable expenditure remains significant and 
is largest for homeowners without mortgages, compared to the other two groups.   
28 These results are very close to those in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009), reported above, which used the entire 
sample of  data on self-reported usage, without considering its relation to actual spending.    23
subcategory in nondurable expenditures. Of course, comparisons of different subsets of 
nondurable expenditure must be interpreted cautiously because of potential non-separabilities 
across goods. 
Further, note that in general the results are statistically weak, with only the estimated 
coefficient for utilities and household operations being statistically significant. This response is 
roughly in proportion to the share of this subcategory in nondurable expenditures. As for the 
other categories, the point estimates suggest a disproportionately large response in alcohol, 
personal care (and miscellaneous items), tobacco, and apparel, though these responses are 
nonetheless statistically insignificant. For such narrow subcategories of expenditures there is 
much more variability in the dependent variable that is unrelated to the payment regressor. Our 
previous results, by summing the subcategories into broader aggregates of nondurable 
expenditures, averaged out much of this unrelated variability (such as, for example, whether a 
trip to the supermarket happened to fall just inside or outside the expenditure reference-period).  
 Panel A of Table 12 provides the analogous decomposition of the response of the 
durable goods and services part of total expenditures (i.e., the part of total expenditures not in the 
nondurables category). While there are sizable responses on average in housing (which includes 
shelter and furniture/appliances) and entertainment (which includes TVs and other electronic 
equipment), these responses are statistically insignificant and not large relative to their category 
share in durable goods. The bulk of the response in durables comes in transportation, spending 
on which increases by 53% of the payments on average, a statistically and economically 
significant amount. This response is large in light of the small average share of transportation in 
durable expenditures. Panel B in turn decomposes the response of the different subcategories of 
transportation. According to the point estimates, the transportation response is largely driven by 
purchases of vehicles, primarily new vehicles. These results imply that auto purchases, although 
weakening during the recession, would have been even weaker in the absence of the payments.   
In sum, receipt of a stimulus payment increased the probability of purchasing a vehicle, 
relative to the counterfactual of no payment, and such purchases are large enough in magnitude 
that they imply large average responses of total expenditures to the payments.  
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IX. Conclusion 
We find that on average households spent about 12-30% of their stimulus payments, 
depending on the specification, on (CE-defined) nondurable expenditures during the three-month 
period in which the payments were received. This response is larger than implied by the LCPIH 
or Ricardian equivalence. We also find a significant effect on the purchase of durable goods, 
primarily the purchase of new vehicles, bringing the average response of total consumption 
expenditures to about 50-90% of the payments in the quarter of receipt. These results are 
statistically and economically significant. They remain broadly consistent and significant across 
specifications that use different forms of variation. Indeed, the point estimates are at the high end 
of these ranges in specifications that focus most directly on randomized timing variation.  
For nondurable expenditures, the estimated spending response to the 2008 EPSs is 
generally only slightly smaller in magnitude (and not significantly different) than the response to 
the 2001 tax rebates. This difference might partly reflect the more transitory nature of the 2008 
tax cut.  However, the composition of spending is different than in 2001, so that the estimated 
spending effect on total expenditures is larger than that in 2001 due to a larger role for durables 
in 2008. This difference might reflect the larger size of the payments in 2008.  
We also find some evidence of an ongoing though smaller response in the subsequent 
three-month period after ESP receipt, but this response cannot be estimated with precision.  
These estimates suggest a significant macroeconomic effect of the 2008 ESPs on 
consumer demand. To give a sense of the effect, we calculate alternative paths for aggregate 
consumption that subtract the direct spending caused by the ESPs, as implied by our point 
estimates and the monthly pattern of distribution of the ESPs. In Figure 3, the (blue) solid line 
shows the National Income and Product Accounts measure of actual total aggregate PCE from 
the third quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009. The dashed lines show this series less 
estimates of the direct spending effect of the ESP program from different specifications used in 
the paper. In all cases the implied effects of the ESPs are economically significant. 
Quantitatively, our preferred point estimates for total expenditures from Tables 4 and 5 imply 
that the ESPs increased PCE by about 1.3 to 2.3 percent in 2008Q2 and 0.6 to 1.0 percent in 
2008Q3 (at annual rates). Of course, this accounting exercise does not include any potential 
effects of resource constraints and multiplier effects, but instead simply reveals the magnitude of 
the direct aggregate demand effect relative to total PCE.     25
Regarding the implementation of new method of delivering tax cuts, the estimated 
responses do not significantly differ across paper checks and electronic transfers.  
Across households, the responses are largest for older and low-income households, 
groups which have substantial and statistically significant spending responses. According to the 
point estimates, the responses are largest for high-asset households but this spending response is 
not statistically significantly different from zero, and more generally all of the asset results suffer 
from a lack of statistical power. Also, homeowners are estimated to have higher spending 
propensities than renters.  
Finally, the responses are largest for self-reported spenders, supporting the 
informativeness of surveys that elicit self-reported usage. However, self-reported savers 
(including those reporting they reduced debt) also spent a statistically and economically 
significant fraction of their payments, suggesting that relying on self-reports can understate the 
actual amount of spending.   26
Appendix A: A notification letter for an ESP by electric funds transfer 
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Appendix B: The 2008 ESP Survey Instrument 
a) The following questions were asked in all CE interviews in June 2008 – March 2009: 
 
[Earlier this year/Last year] the Federal government approved an economic stimulus package. 
[Many households will receive a one-time economic stimulus payment, either by check or direct 
deposit/Previously you or your CU [[consumer unit]] reported receiving one or more economic 
stimulus payments.] This is also called a tax rebate and is different from a refund on your annual 
income taxes.  
 
Since the first of the reference month, have you or any members of your CU received a/an 
additional 
10. Tax rebate? [Economic Stimulus Payment]  
99. None/No more entries  
 
Who was the rebate for? [enter text] _____________  
* Collect each rebate separately and include the name(s) of the recipient(s). 
 
In what month did you receive the rebate? [enter text] _____________  
 
What was the total amount of the rebate? [enter value] _____________ 
* Probe if the amount is not an expected increment such as $300, $600, $900, $1,200, etc 
 
Was the rebate received by - ?  
1. check? 
2. direct deposit?  
 
Did you or any members of your CU receive any other tax rebate [economic stimulus payment]?  
1. Yes 
2. No  
If yes, return to “Who was the tax rebate for?” 
 
b) The following question was asked (during June 2008 – March 2009) of households that 
previously reported receiving an economic stimulus payment. Once the question was answered, 
it was not asked again.  
 
[Earlier in this interview/Last interview/Previously] [you/your consumer unit] reported receiving 
a one-time tax rebate that was part of the Federal government's economic stimulus package.  Did 
the tax rebate lead [you/your consumer unit] mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase 
savings, or mostly to pay off debt? 
 
1.  mostly to increase spending 
2.  mostly to increase saving 
3.  mostly to pay off debt 
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Appendix C: The CE Data 
We construct the economic stimulus payment variable ESP from the CE ESP data 
(Appendix A) in a similar manner to JPS’s construction of the 2001 tax rebate variable. The 
2008 data require fewer consistency checks and adjustments, however. This is partly because by 
2008 the CE survey used CAPI software to input and cross-check respondents’ replies. 
Moreover, with a few exceptions, each interview records only ESPs received during the months 
of the interview’s reference period. We adjusted the exceptions to bring their payments into the 
appropriate consumption reference period.    
We use the following definitions of the other main variables. Age is the average age of 
the head and spouse when the household is a married couple, otherwise it is just the age of the 
head. The number of children is calculated as the number of members of the household younger 
than 18.  
Following Lusardi (1996), strictly nondurable expenditures include expenditures on food 
(away from home, at home and alcoholic beverages), utilities (and fuels and public services), 
household operations, public transportation and gas and motor oil, personal care, tobacco, and 
miscellaneous goods. Nondurable expenditures (broadly defined) adds spending on apparel 
goods and services, health care (excluding payments by employers or insurers), and reading 
materials, following Lusardi (1996) but excluding education. Total expenditure adds spending on 
education, housing (including furniture and appliances and shelter but excluding utilities and 
household operations, which are already included in nondurable expenditures), transportation 
(including vehicle purchases, maintenance, and insurance, but excluding public transportation 
and gas and motor oil), and entertainment (e.g., including TVs and other electronics, as well as 
fees).   
Turning to the sample, we omit observations missing any of the key data that we use in 
our regressions. Our sample omits the bottom one percent of nondurable consumption 
expenditures in levels (after adjusting for family size and allowing for a time trend), since this 
data implies implausibly small (often negative) consumption expenditures. Finally, we drop 
household observations that report living in student housing, that report age less than 21 or 
greater than 85, that report age changing by more than one or a negative amount between 
quarters, or that report changes in the number of children or adults greater than three in absolute 
magnitude. When we split the sample based on income, we drop households flagged as   29
incompletely reporting income. When we split based on liquid assets, we drop households if the 
asset information used in computing initial assets (as the difference between final assets and the 
change in assets) is topcoded.  
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 Table 1: The timing of the economic stimulus payments
Last two digits of  
taxpayer SSN
Date ESP funds 
transferred to 
account by
Last two digits of  
taxpayer SSN
Date ESP check in 
the mail by
00 – 20 May 2 00 – 09 May 16
21 – 75 May 9 10 – 18 May 23
76 – 99 May 16 19 – 25 May 30
26 – 38 June 6
39 – 51 June 13
52 – 63 June 20
64 – 75 June 27
76 – 87 July 4
88 – 99 July 11
Source: Internal Revenue Service (http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=180247,00.html)
Panel A: Payments by electronic 
funds transfer
Panel B: Payments by paper checkTable 2: Sample statistics
Sample:
Variable Mean (std dev) Mean (std dev) Mean (std dev) Mean (std dev)
Expenditures on:
  Food 1,902        (1,356)         1,910        (1,305)       1,792        (1,336)         2,045        (1,176)      
  Strictly nondurables 4,298        (2,657)         4,361        (2,440)       4,077        (2,418)         4,690        (2,304)      
  Nondurables 5,342        (3,296)         5,461        (2,973)       5,090        (2,943)         5,901        (2,827)      
  Total 10,492      (8,124)         10,591      (7,228)       9,694        (6,999)         11,713      (7,162)      
Change in Expenditures on:
  Food 7.7 (1,130)         12.7 (1,115)       16.8 (1,164)         6.2 (1,018)      
  Strictly nondurables 59.0 (1,918)         59.1 (1,820)       48.4 (1,807)         73.3 (1,796)      
  Nondurables 46.7 (2,279)         49.3 (2,180)       38.2 (2,174)         62.1 (2,148)      
  Total -87.5 (7,361)         -80.9 (7,165)       -36.3 (6,675)         -153.6 (7,628)      
Level of:
  Number of Adults 1.9 (0.8) 1.9 (0.8) 1.9 (0.8) 1.9 (0.7)
  Number of Children 0.7 (1.1) 0.8 (1.1) 0.7 (1.1) 0.9 (1.1)
Change in:
  Number of Adults 0.0 (0.24) 0.0 (0.23) 0.0 (0.24) 0.0 (0.23)
  Number of Children 0.0 (0.19) 0.0 (0.19) 0.0 (0.20) 0.0 (0.18)
Age 48.4 (14.9) 48.5 (14.8) 50.6 (15.4) 45.4 (13.2)
ESP 215 (472) 307 (538) 284 (496) 332 (581)
I(ESP>0) 0.23 (0.42) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46)
ESP| ESP>0 (N=690) 960 (520) 971 (518) 899 (490) 1082 (527)
Income 74,770      (148,814)     66,387      (108,738)    58,153      (103,035)     77,310      (112,638)   
Liquid Assets 9,553        (20,193)       9,959        (20,145)      9,244        (19,454)       11,165      (21,466)     
Notes: The first two samples correspond to those used in Table 4 and Table 5 Panel C. The final two samples together with households that 
receive payments both by electronic transfer of funds and by check, comprise the sample used in Table 6 Panels B and C. The samples used 
to calculate income and liquid assets data include only households with valid information on these variables and so are subsamples of the 
samples used in these tables. For the income and assets variables, the on-time recipients sample corresponds to the samples used in the final 
two triplets of columns in Table 8.
Households with only
on-time ESPs by check
Households with only
on-time ESPs by EFT On-time recipients Full sampleTable 3: The distribution of reported economic stimulus payments
Sample:
Percent of Percent of Percent of
ESP value Number ESPs Number ESPs Number ESPs
0<ESP<300 47 1.5 26 1.6 10 1.0
ESP=300 343 11.2 220 13.1 69 6.8
300<ESP<600 77 2.5 40 2.4 16 1.6
ESP=600 943 30.9 558 33.3 278 27.3
600<ESP<900 52 1.7 31 1.8 13 1.3
ESP=900 168 5.5 99 5.9 55 5.4
900<ESP<1200 42 1.4 27 1.6 11 1.1
ESP=1200 800 26.2 440 26.3 287 28.2
1200<ESP<1500 27 0.9 15 0.9 9 0.9
ESP=1500 213 7.0 88 5.3 104 10.2
1500<ESP<1800 25 0.8 11 0.7 12 1.2
ESP=1800 195 6.4 74 4.4 99 9.7
1800<ESP<2100 7 0.2 1 0.1 4 0.4
ESP=2100 63 2.1 25 1.5 31 3.0
2100<ESP<2400 4 0.1 0 0.0 4 0.4
ESP=2400 23 0.8 9 0.5 9 0.9
2400<ESP<2700 1 0.0 1 0.1 0 0.0
ESP=2700 7 0.2 4 0.2 2 0.2
2700<ESP<3000 2 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1
ESP=3000 10 0.3 4 0.2 4 0.4
ESP>3000 3 0.1 2 0.1 0 0.0
Mean Num (%) of obs Mean Num (%) of obs Mean Num (%) of obs
Expenditure Period ESP| ESP>0 with ESP>0 ESP| ESP>0 with ESP>0 ESP| ESP>0 with ESP>0
Mar - May, 2008 1,021           467  (33) 858           136  (33) 1,091        308  (88)
Apr - June, 2008 1,009           780  (57) 932           397  (76) 1,091        341  (100)
May - July, 2008 973              924  (68) 909           572  (98) 1,071        298  (100)
June- Aug, 2008 891              539  (39) 867           398  (78) 1,043        71  (20)
July - Sept, 2008 875              223  (16) 917           151  (28) -            0  (0)
Aug - Oct, 2008 811              62  (5) 735           22  (4) -            0  (0)
Sept - Nov, 2008 703              22  (2) -            0  (0) -            0  (0)
Oct - Dec, 2008 703              20  (1) -            0  (0) -            0  (0)
Nov - Jan, 2009 890              11  (1) -            0  (0) -            0  (0)
Dec - Feb, 2009 435              4  (0) -            0  (0) -            0  (0)
Notes: The first sample corresponds to that used in Table 4. The second and third samples together with households that receive 
payments both by electronic funds transfer and by check, comprise the sample used in Table 6 Panel  C.
Full sample
Households with only on-
time ESPs by check
Households with only on-
time ESPs by EFT
Panel B: by expenditure period




































method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
ESP 0.016 0.079 0.121 0.516 0.012 0.079 0.128 0.523
(0.027) (0.046) (0.055) (0.179) (0.033) (0.060) (0.071) (0.219)
I(ESP) 10.9 74.8 121.5 494.5 0.69 1.74 2.09 3.24
(31.7) (56.6) (67.2) (207.2) (1.27) (0.96) (0.94) (1.17)
Age 0.72 -0.23 0.96 6.56 0.70 -0.35 0.77 5.77 0.048 0.009 0.029 0.045 0.70 -0.20 1.00 6.60
(0.34) (0.65) (0.81) (2.25) (0.34) (0.65) (0.81) (2.24) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 (0.30) (0.60) (0.80) (2.30)
Change in 198 448 561 452 198 448 561 452 8.96 8.43 8.99 4.78 198 448 561 453
  # adults (55) (106) (118) (375) (55) (106) (118) (375) (1.77) (1.34) (1.32) (1.63) (55) (106) (118) (375)
Change in  89 139 185 -254 89 139 186 -252 4.50 3.35 3.93 1.42 89 139 185 -254
  # children (48) (96) (111) (388) (48) (96) (111) (388) (2.02) (1.53) (1.50) (2.10) (48) (96) (111) (388)
Num of obs 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,427 17,475 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478
Dollar change in Dollar change in Percent change in Dollar change in
Notes: All regressions also include a full set of month dummies, following equation (1). Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and 
heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in the third set of columns are multiplied by 100 so as to report a percent change. The last four columns report results from 2SLS 























 method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
ESP 0.073 0.117 0.507 0.071 0.123 0.509
(0.050) (0.060) (0.196) (0.068) (0.081) (0.253)
I(ESP) 2.20 2.63 3.97
(1.09) (1.07) (1.34)
I(ΣhouseholdESP t>0) 12.01 9.58 21.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 12.66 8.23 20.77
(30.74) (36.07) (104.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (33.03) (38.79) (112.18)
Number of obs 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,475 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478 17,478
 
ESP 0.144 0.185 0.683 0.207 0.252 0.866
(0.054) (0.066) (0.219) (0.087) (0.103) (0.329)
I(ESP) 3.97 3.91 5.63
(1.36) (1.34) (1.69)
Number of obs 11,239 11,239 11,239 11,238 11,239 11,239 11,239 11,239 11,239
ESP 0.188 0.214 0.590 0.262 0.308 0.911
(0.058) (0.070) (0.217) (0.092) (0.112) (0.342)
I(ESP) 4.61 4.52 6.05
(1.53) (1.50) (1.89)
Number of obs 10,488 10,488 10,488 10,487 10,488 10,488 10,488 10,488 10,488
Dependent
 Variable: Dollar change in Percent change in Dollar change in
Panel B: Sample of households receiving ESPs
Panel C: Sample of households receiving only on-time ESPs
Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the household, and a 
full set of month dummies. Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The 
coefficients in the second triplet of coumns are multiplied by 100 so as to report a percent change. The final triplet of columns report results 
from 2SLS regressions where the indicator variable for ESP receipt and the other regressors are used as instruments for the amount of the ESP. 
The variable I(ΣhouseholdESP h>0) is an indicator for households that received an ESP in some reference quarter, whereas  I(ESP >0) indicates 
receipt in the contemporaneous quarter (t+1) in particular.




























 method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
ESP by Check 0.104 0.141 0.473 0.060 0.112 0.333
(0.064) (0.077) (0.215) (0.087) (0.104) (0.305)
ESP by EFT 0.086 0.144 0.583 0.108 0.169 0.661
(0.066) (0.081) (0.305) (0.083) (0.097) (0.332)
I(ESP by check) 1.92 2.19 3.59
(1.31) (1.29) (1.61)
I(ESP by EFT) 2.81 3.35 4.00
(1.44) (1.41) (1.83)
Number of obs 17,281 17,281 17,281 17,278 17,281 17,281 17,281 17,281 17,281
 
ESP by Check 0.220 0.245 0.746 0.257 0.308 0.868
(0.072) (0.086) (0.235) (0.110) (0.133) (0.379)
ESP by EFT 0.188 0.218 0.361 0.281 0.313 0.702
Dollar change in Dollar change in
Panel B: Sample of households receiving only on-time ESPs
Panel A: Sample of all households
Percent change in
y
(0.071) (0.090) (0.317) (0.095) (0.117) (0.402)
I(ESP by check) 4.13 3.99 5.78
(1.67) (1.63) (2.03)
I(ESP by EFT) 5.19 4.84 4.30
(1.83) (1.81) (2.38)
Number of obs 10,362 10,362 10,362 10,361 10,362 10,362 10,362 10,362 10,362
ESP 0.187 0.211 0.529 0.240 0.262 0.784
(0.066) (0.078) (0.232) (0.128) (0.149) (0.401)
I(ESP) 3.96 3.63 5.48
(1.87) (1.79) (2.23)
Number of obs 10,362 10,362 10,362 10,361      10,362      10,362      10,362 10,362 10,362
Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the age of 
the household, a full set of month dummies, and indicators for: a) receiving only ESPs by check; b) receiving only 
EFTs; and c) receiving both checks and EFTs. In panels B and C, there are also separate sets of all other control 
variables for households in categories a), b), and c). Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household 
correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in the second triplet of coumns are multiplied by 100 so as to report 
a percent change. The final triplet of columns reports results from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP>0),its interactions, 
and the other regressors are used as instruments for ESP and its interactions.
Panel C: Households receiving only on-time ESPs, 


























 method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
ESP t+1 or I(ESP t+1) 0.186 0.201 0.517 3.58 3.92 4.96 0.219 0.254 0.757
(0.055) (0.067) (0.211) (1.58) (1.55) (1.96) (0.089) (0.110) (0.360)
ESP t or I(ESP t) -0.009 -0.054 -0.288 -2.09 -1.23 -2.22 -0.076 -0.097 -0.278
(0.068) (0.080) (0.214) (1.51) (1.50) (1.92) (0.092) (0.113) (0.330)
Implied spending effect in 0.177 0.147 0.229 NA NA NA 0.143 0.157 0.479
second three-month period (0.087) (0.104) (0.303) (0.142) (0.178) (0.568)
Implied cumulative fraction
of rebate spent over both  0.363 0.348 0.746 NA NA NA 0.362 0.411 1.236
three-month periods (0.128) (0.155) (0.477) (0.218) (0.273) (0.892)
Number of observations 10,488 10,488 10,488 10,487 10,488 10,488 10,488 10,488 10,488
 
Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the household, and a 
full set of month dummies. The sample includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs. Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary 
within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in the second triplet of columns are multiplied by 100 so as to report 
a percent change. The final triplet of columns reports results from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP) and the other regressors are used as 
instruments for ESP.
Dependent
























ESP 0.269 0.345 0.952 0.157 0.215 0.568 0.297 0.275 0.851
  (0.110) (0.133) (0.398) (0.096) (0.124) (0.442) (0.134) (0.164) (0.558)
ESP*Low -0.103 -0.150 -0.461 0.096 0.024 0.715 -0.181 -0.253 -0.844
(group difference) (0.101) (0.124) (0.399) (0.121) (0.155) (0.500) (0.156) (0.184) (0.527)
ESP*High 0.100 0.044 0.414 0.026 -0.009 0.205 -0.051 -0.075 0.083
(group difference) (0.121) (0.151) (0.472) (0.113) (0.139) (0.466) (0.154) (0.186) (0.631)
Number of obs 10,488 10,488 10,488 8,592 8,592 8,592 5,071 5,071 5,071
Low group 0.166 0.195 0.491 0.253 0.239 1.283 0.116 0.022 0.007
(0.092) (0.114) (0.394) (0.137) (0.180) (0.564) (0.173) (0.205) (0.566)
High group 0.369 0.389 1.366 0.183 0.206 0.773 0.246 0.200 0.934
(0.136) (0.168) (0.498) (0.105) (0.133) (0.464) (0.162) (0.202) (0.678)
Dollar change in Dollar change in Dollar change in
Low: ≤ 40 Low: ≤ 32,000 Low: ≤ 500
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Interaction: Age Interaction: Income Interaction: Liquid Assets
Notes: All regressions also include separate intercepts for the High and Low groups, the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the 
age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs. All results are from 2SLS regressions 
where I(ESP>0) and its interactions, along with the other regressors, are used as instruments for ESP and its interactions. Reported standard errors are adjusted 
for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. All sample splits are chosen to include about 1/3 of ESP recipients in each grouping.
High: age >58 High: > 74,677 High: > 7,000








ESP 0.197 0.213 0.431
(0.128) (0.153) (0.455)
ESP*I(Owned with mortgage) 0.030 0.043 0.543
(group difference) (0.110) (0.131) (0.394)
ESP*I(Owned without mortgage) 0.175 0.260 0.800
(group difference) (0.133) (0.169) (0.514)
N 10,380 10,380 10,380
Implied total spending
Homeowners with 0.227 0.256 0.974
mortgages (0.093) (0.112) (0.364)
Homeowners without 0.372 0.473 1.231
mortgages (0.135) (0.175) (0.508)
Notes: All regressions also include separate intercepts for owners with mortgages and owners 
without, the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the 
household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample includes only households receiving only on-
time ESPs, and excludes households that occupy without payment of cash rent or that live in student 
housing. All results are from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP>0) and its interactions, along with the 
other regressors, are used as instruments for ESP and its interactions. Reported standard errors are 
adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity.
First interaction: owners with mortgages (50%)
Second interaction: owners without mortgages (27%)
Baseline group: renters (23% of sample)







ESP 0.230 0.173 0.952
(0.131) (0.162) (0.465)
ESP*I(Report mostly spend) 0.158 0.349 0.755
(group difference) (0.136) (0.169) (0.496)
ESP*I(Report mostly pay debt) -0.005 0.098 -0.319
(group difference) (0.126) (0.156) (0.453)
N 10,072 10,072 10,072
Implied total spending
Households that self-report 0.388 0.522 1.707
mostly to increase spending (0.115) (0.142) (0.457)
Households that self-report 0.225 0.271 0.633
mostly to pay off debts (0.106) (0.131) (0.393)
Notes: All regressions also include separate intercepts for each self-reported usage category, the change in the 
number of adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the household, and a full set of month 
dummies. The sample includes only households self-reporting usage and receiving only on-time ESPs. All 
results are from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP>0) and its interactions, along with the other regressors, are 
used as instruments for ESP and its interactions. Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-
household correlations and heteroskedasticity.
Second interaction: mostly pay debt (50%)
First interaction: mostly spend (32%)
Baseline group: mostly save (18% of sample)
Dollar change inTable 11: The propensity to spend on subcategories of non-durable expenditures
Dependent Panel A: Food



















ESP 0.050 0.025 0.011 0.059 0.083 0.027 0.007 0.022 0.025 -0.001
(0.032) (0.033) (0.007) (0.027) (0.049) (0.039) (0.009) (0.021) (0.048) (0.003)
Implied share of change
in non-durable spending 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.19 0.27 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.00
Avg. share of non-
durable spending 0.25 0.10 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.01
 
Panel C: Additional nondurables Panel B: Additional strictly nondurables
Notes: N=10,488 for all regressions. All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the 
household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs. Reported standard errors are adjusted for 
arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. All results are from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP) and the other regressors are used as 
instruments for ESP.
Dollar change inTable 12: The propensity to spend on subcategories of durable expenditures
Dependent
























ESP 0.099 0.077 -0.100 0.527 0.357 0.123 0.011 0.009 0.027
(0.092) (0.099) (0.042) (0.269) (0.204) (0.149) (0.054) (0.028) (0.024)
Implied share of change
in durable spending 0.16 0.13 -0.17 0.87 0.59 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.04
Avg. share of
durable spending 0.56 0.13 0.04 0.27 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.09
Notes: N=10,488 for all regressions. All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the household, and a full set 
of month dummies. The sample includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs. Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and 
heteroskedasticity. All results are from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP) and the other regressors are used as instruments for ESP.
Panel A: Subcategories of durable spending Panel B: Subcategories of transportation

















StatementsFigure 2: Histograms of change in expenditure for ESP recipients during the program
Panel B: change in total expenditure
Current recipients Current nonrecipients
Panel A: change in nondurable expenditure
Current recipients Current nonrecipients
Notes: Plots are histograms of change in expenditures in household-periods. The sample of households 
includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs at some time. The sample period includes only 
periods in which some households report receiving on-time ESPs during the second three-month period 
covered in the change (interviews from June through October 2008).  The total number of households is 
normalized to be equal across samples so that the histogram is a discrete estimate of the density function.
Panel B: change in total expenditure
Current recipients Current nonrecipients
Panel A: change in nondurable expenditure
Current recipients Current nonrecipientsFigure 3: Actual aggregate personal consumption expenditures and alternatives 
Notes: All calculations use estimates from instrumental variables specifications. Alternative scenarios subtract only the 
estimated direct effect of the stimulus payments on spending. The aggregate effect is calculated by applying the 
estimated average share of stimulus payments spent to the actual monthly time series of payments. We assume that the 




















measured contemporaneous share spent is spent evenly over the month of receipt and the subsequent month, and that 
any lagged spending occurs evenly over the following three months.  